Resolving the dispute

BACKBENCHER
Rod Kapunan
6/18-19/2011



I guess it would be prudent for the government to pursue a policy that would serve to maintain our status quo in the Spratly islands. That approach in solving our dispute with China is to solve it from the standpoint of realpolitik. Along that line, we have to set aside all legal and historical basis, like citing the proclamation made by President Elpidio Quirino in 1946, for that could only result in endless debate much that China could equally insist its claim dates back to centuries long before the Philippines was colonized by Spain.

Besides, even after Filipino mariner Tomas Cloma claimed to have discovered the islands in 1957, and asserted ownership by calling them Freedom Islands, he however failed to maintain a permanent foothold if only to satisfy the international law requirement of effective physical occupation. On the contrary, it was only in 1971, after President Ferdinand Marcos sent a military outpost, when we managed to satisfy that requirement. President Marcos in fact issued Presidential Decree 1596 on June 11, 1978 formally annexing the Kalayaan Group of Islands in the Spratlys at a time when the thawing in Sino-Philippine relations was at its peak.

Moreover, even if we argue that our claim was well ahead of Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and, mind you, France, it would not help legally bolster our position. In the absence of diplomatic agreement, it is power that would ultimately resolve the dispute, and we do not have the capability to enforce that. This has become evident in the race to occupy all those islets which came about because of the discovery of oil and natural gas deposits.

The presence of those precious resources within the China Sea rim promptly compelled China and the rest to assert their sovereignty, although by geographical proximity Palawan is much closer to the Spratlys to confirm that it is part of the continental shelf connecting the Philippine archipelago to validate our claim under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas.

To be sure, there is no way we can extend our occupation over the rest of the disputed islands. But even if we have a legal as well as historic basis, taking a belligerent stand could only deteriorate an already tense situation for which we do not have the capability to make good on our belligerency.

Neither can we rely on the presence of the US navy to act as our big brother. In fact, our dependence on the US military umbrella has resulted in the redefinition of our strategic position, thereby making our interest subservient to that of the US. So, for us to play the game of brinkmanship is to play Russian roulette for it could trigger a backlash with China possibly evicting us out to the area, and that could be most humiliating.

At the moment while tenuous peace continues to breeze the area, our best option to is to keep open the dialogue for negotiations, and explore the possibility of a joint venture and cooperation. We have to be more realistic for at the rate China is modernizing its armed forces there is no way we could match that. Neither can we relay on the US as our proxy in the event of war, even if we roll ourselves to the ground to emphasize the value of our military alliance with them.

Objectively, there is no way we could influence China to change the course of its foreign policy. But certainly the formula of joint venture and cooperation to harness the resources in the area is most practical for it carries with it an assurance that our presence in some of the islands will be respected. It will also reassure China because for the first time we managed to resolve our dispute with them within the framework of bilateral negotiations without us clinging on to the apron of Uncle Sam.

Notably, the country’s ambivalent position is evident, for while at times we appear to be conciliatory in wanting to peacefully resolve the dispute, often we are mouthing the alarmist and jingoistic drum beatings of the US; that allegedly there have been incursions by the Chinese gunboats, buildup of additional ports, barracks and communication facilities, and even accusing China of buzzing our fishermen and soldiers in the islands.

Such inflammatory statements will not help ease the tension. On the contrary, many believe we are being incited by those war-quenched neo-liberals in Washington who obviously wants to place our position at a most disadvantage, while they continue cultivate their own economic gains with China.

In fact, it is doubtful whether the eagerness of the US in pressuring us to take a hard-line stand would suffice to assure us it would come to our succor in the event of an open conflict. If ever they would act, that would only be in pursuit of their interest which is not exactly parallel to our interest. Even that is doubtful whether the US would risk a war that would exact from it an unimaginable cost, taking into account that China is no Santo Domingo or Nicaragua.

But one thing is clear: the US has no strategic interest in the Spratlys for it to risk a war, except: First, if its naval and commercial ships that navigate the China Sea are attacked. Second, if it sees the possibility that China’s control of the potentially-rich oilfields could strategically jeopardize US industrial and military requirements. In the absence of these two possibilities, it is unlikely for the US to come to our assistance even if we are to invoke our defense pact with the Americans.

Already, the US is inciting Vietnam into antagonizing China by holding a joint military exercise in the area. But underneath that effort to seal an agreement with Vietnam for a joint oil exploration, it hopes that its renewed friendship with that country would help erase from the mind of the Vietnamese people the atrocities committed by US soldiers during the war where more than five million of their compatriots were killed. It is the usual power game of using one to isolate the other which is dangerous for the one being pitted against the other.

(rodkap@yahoo.com.ph)