Sunday, October 7, 2012

The presidency or the republic (Part III)

BACKBENCHER
Rod P. Kapunan
10/6-7/2012



Third, we ought to recall that when President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, the nation was already teetering towards chaos. Both the Left and the Right were collaborating in a systematic campaign to topple the government. Given that situation, the declaration of martial law was not the result of any personal motivation, but a duty reposed upon him as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. No President could abnegate from that responsibility without committing treason.

As some political observers would put it, martial law was a big political gamble for Marcos. It was political suicide because his chances of being redeemed were slim. Yet, for that act of trying to save the Republic, he was condemned. There could be truth to that if he used martial law to consolidate power, in lieu of not having accomplished anything. On the contrary, he was the only president to be reelected in a clean, honest and fair election on the basis of his achievements in the 1969 election against Sergio Osmeña, Jr. He even obtained more votes in his reelection bid than when he first ran against President Diosdado Macapagal in 1965.

Besides, when Marcos declared martial law, his term had yet to expire up to January 1973. However, the ratification of the 1973 Constitution by the people automatically made him the interim President, and the process of ratification was upheld by the Supreme Court in the cases of Javellana vs. Executive Secretary and Sanidad vs. Comelec.

It follows that those who were affected should never interpret their experience as a personal injury inflicted by the State or by Marcos, but the price for their participation to ripen their brand of revolution. Invariably, the charge that Marcos suspended the writ and later imposed martial law just to hold on to power is an attempt to distort historical facts. In the first place, martial law could have been avoided had it not for the Maoists' virulent agitation and attacks against the government.

Fourth, martial law is constitutionally provided, and the president is mandated to exercise it when necessary. The present constitution, as well as the 1935 Constitution which Marcos invoked, provides for that kind of defensive political mechanism.

Some constitutionalists and political writers would even go as far as saying that the survival of the State remains paramount; that in its defense, power could be exercised by the president even if not provided in the constitution. Classic to this was when US Chief Justice Roger B. Taney questioned the authority of President Abraham Lincoln to declare martial law, saying there was no provision in the US Constitution giving him that power.

That question cropped up in that famous incident where an arrest order was issued without a warrant to a secessionist leader in Maryland by the name of John Merryman. Justice Taney ordered the release of Merryman, but President Lincoln ignored it. Justice Taney then raised the point about the authority of President Lincoln to declare martial law. For that, Lincoln wryly asked: "Are we going to save the Constitution or the Union?"

That famous comment made by Lincoln thus carved out a political and constitutional theory that the survival of the State remains paramount; that it could act in its defense even if not so provided in the Constitution.

In the case of President Marcos, the issues about the constitutionality and validity in the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and subsequent declaration of martial law are provided in the 1935 Constitution, specifically Section 10(2), Article VII. The leeway given to the petitioners who questioned his exercise of the emergency power was indicative that the liberties of the people remain primordial to him. It cannot be less than that, for he only had on his side the truth; that as President, his duty is to protect the people, their government, and their sacred institutions.

For that matter, even the Cory Aquino-commissioned 1987 Constitution provided for the same emergency political mechanism in Section 18, Article VII although imposing stringent conditions to validate its imposition.

If there were murky issues that were not clearly resolved by the Supreme Court, the validity in the imposition of martial law nonetheless should have been laid to rest. It is not that we want the petitioners to acquiesce to those errors, assuming there were errors, but on the basis that the high court has already spoken. As a rule, the opposition-petitioners are duty-bound to accept the decision, except when there is a palpable denial of due process or that it was arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. Nobody has the right to reject the decision on the basis that he disagrees with it.

The decision arrived at by the majority of the members of the Supreme Court did not only uphold the legality and constitutionality of martial law, but most important affirmed the factual basis that warranted its imposition. Maybe Marcos benefited from that valid and legal exercise of power, but fate of circumstance was clear that whoever was the President during those tense and unsettling hours in the life of the Republic would nonetheless have done the same. If General MacArthur was quoted saying "there is no substitute for victory", there is also that equal truism that nobody would readily part away his own survival.

Fifth, often we fail to weigh between the positive and negative effects of martial law. Those who were harping in defense of people's rights should have taken that first step to balance the temporary curtailment of their freedom from the higher goals martial law sought to accomplish.

(rpkapunan@gmail.com)

The presidency or the republic (Part II)

BACKBENCHER
Rod P. Kapunan
9/29-30/2012



Former President Ferdinand Marcos was categorical in citing the Plaza Miranda bombing as the reason that impelled him to issue Proclamation 889 as amended by Proclamation No. 889-A, suspending the writ of habeas corpus.

One must observe that when Marcos placed the country under martial law, the government was still groping in knowing the identity of those behind the bombing of the Liberal Party's miting de avanse at Plaza Miranda.

Despite the admission made by a leading communist cadre, Ariel Almendral, that the bombing was the handiwork of the New People's Army identified as a certain Danny Cordero. Jose Ma. Sison and his ilk in the Communist Party of the Philippines not only refused to admit having masterminded the dastardly crime, but continued to point to Marcos to purposely discredit him from the ranks of the opposition. To this day, the Maoists and their mulching front organizations insist their liberties were curtailed while consistently denying that it was their crime that impelled Marcos to suspend the writ.

As an overtly ambitious politician, Jovito Salonga already had his eyes focused on the presidency. He had every reason to believe he would be the next president, for the fact that he consistently landed number one in the senatorial slate. Even after he came to know it was Sison and his gang that carried out the bombing, Salonga sought to delay the release of that information by the media for fear it would affect his presidential candidacy, which in fact happened—with Mrs. Imelda Marcos obtaining more votes than him in the 1992 presidential elections.

Second, judging the effects of martial law on a personal basis, and not from a collective point of view, would certainly elicit negative reaction. The conduct of the opposition to prejudge martial law on a personal basis exposed the truth that somehow many of them endorsed the criminal activities of the Maoist communists. Their campaign to resist martial law was revealing of their involvement. Not one from the opposition opened his mouth about the aborted arms landings at Digoyo Point in Palanan, Isabela, by MV Karragatan and by MV Andrea from May to July 1972 headed by Ibarra Tubianosa. One must bear in mind that martial law is a situation where the State has to take a defensive action to preserve the majesty of its authority. This part of the "Whereas" clause stated by Marcos in Proclamation 1081, and was confirmed by Gregg Jones in his book: Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement.

Unfortunately, instead of the communists being brought to justice to face the consequence of their criminal acts, it was the government that was placed on the defensive with its hands tied to answering charges of human rights violation filed by the same group now claiming compensation—often with the help of the opposition.

Besides, even if we take it that isolated cases of human rights violations were committed, they happened not as a policy of the government, but an aberration committed by some zealot law-enforcing authorities. The government tried as much as possible to investigate all complaints, and if there was prima facie evidence, filed charges against those erring government officials. Marcos, no less, cited those complaints against military personnel tasked in enforcing martial law.

Marcos' decision to reduce the number, area, demand for rental and eventual termination of the US military bases on September 16, 1990; not to renew the Laurel-Langley Agreement beyond July 3, 1974; to open diplomatic relations with China, and the USSR; to actively participate in the Non-Aligned Movement or Group of 77; to embark on industrialization by his announcement of the eleven industrial projects; and to incorporate nationalistic provisions in the 1973 Constitution all contributed to cause the ire of the US. That could have bridged the ideological gap that separated the Maoists from Marcos. Alas, Sison would rather be credited alone in achieving them.

In retaliation, Washington then worked to isolate Marcos politically and economically, and human rights violation was its best instrument to discredit his administration. The Maoists, instead of maintaining a safe distance to avoid being manipulated, allowed themselves to be used when they could have stayed neutral. After all, US imperialism is a much bigger problem than in dealing with a "local tyrant." It was their opportunism that prevailed. They took advantage of the changing political wind that the US is now committed to removing its one-time ally, and daydreaming that his ouster would result in them being on top of the political saddle.

This explains why the Maoists could not escape from their clichés of calling every President a "dictator" without having second thoughts that they are tacitly endorsing another US-sponsored politician who would not give them an inch of political accommodation. The result is pathetic. Every time the government in power is ousted, it is always the so-called "progressive left" that ends up being politically marginalized, while the enemies they denounce gain further political and economic influence.

Their favorite strategy of "united front alliance" no sooner breaks up after the objective of ousting the one in power is accomplished. This was evident in what happened in the two Edsa "People Power" events. The net result is that American influence over the Aquino and Arroyo governments became more prominent. People had to blame them because they could only understand that they suffered more for failing to make good their promise of deliverance from poverty. This explains why after Marcos, the fad that brought the student activism to glory soon evaporated. Nothing in fact has changed. Adventurism only pushed them deeper into the pit of hopelessness.

Since, the US was committed in destroying the legacy of the only nationalist President this country ever had, it has to support the radical left on the issue of human rights violation. Unfortunately, the Maoists failed to read between the lines that the reason why the US courts admitted the list of claimants is that they too were interested in getting hold of those Marcos assets, and not for purposes of distributing them.