BACKBENCHER
Rod Kapunan
8/13-14/2011
Should the government panel agree to the suggestion advanced by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front on the creation of a sub-state? The Moros would have gotten what they wanted without firing a single bullet or shedding a drop of blood. We say this because a sub-state, by any political and functional definition, is a state made to exist alongside the state from which it will be carved out. Its existence within the sovereign jurisdiction of a state is the last thing embattled states would do as they struggle to keep intact their national territory would do.
The so-called “concession” advanced by MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal—that the government would still be in control over national defense, foreign relations and currency—is pure nonsense. The fiction of a sub-state could easily be set aside once the other contracting party sees it fit to drop the agreement. There is no way we could withdraw our recognition. Maybe we can scrap it, but definitely not on its status. After all, the term is only a political icing one could easily set aside.
Such is the implication: there would be international recognition that indeed a state existed within a state. Thus, even if the agreement is revoked, those demarcated areas identified as sub-state will remain as such with all the trappings and elements of a state. This observation is not meant to douse cold water to the current peace initiative, but is intended to put the process in proper perspective. This is to negotiate from within the framework of our national sovereignty and Constitution.
It means that no negotiations should take place that would allow the other party to slice a portion of our national territory just to accommodate peace by appeasement. This has to be emphasized for there is no such thing as sub-state under international law. Whoever conceived that clearly wants to entrap the government into recognizing a state, functioning and operating well within its own national borders. Although the word “state” will be hyphenated with the word “sub”, there is nothing that could prevent other states sympathetic to it from elevating and recognizing that area into a full state.
By contrasting the term “state” from that of a “province” or “autonomous” area or region, one could easily visualize what we are trying to drive at. Political subdivisions termed as “province” or “autonomous region” are not necessary components to the creation of a bigger political subdivision called “state.” Even without that political subdivision or demarcation, a state could exist. But when political subdivisions are elevated to the level of a state, their status could invariably and effectively destroy the state. Either it is dissolved, or it loses a portion of its territory.
This explains why in all instances where people in a given political subdivision aspire to become a state, that process is often resolved in a bloody civil war or war for national liberation. In that instance, the seceding province or autonomous region must win. If it loses, it reverts to its status as an integral political component of that state.
It is on this score why it is politically anachronistic and suicidal for the Philippines to accede to the MILF’s suggestion. The creation of a landlocked Kosovo-type state in Mindanao could complicate the problem with possibly gangster-like international organizations as NATO savagely bombing this country allegedly to prevent another genocidal cleansing.
In fact, creating a sub-state is far worse than giving the MILF a status of belligerency. Belligerency status is extended only if it has become apparent that the rebels have shown the capacity to secede, while it has become untenable for the state seeking to contain the rebellion to regain those territories back to its jurisdictional control.
Such is evident once the rebels have achieved the strategic stalemate in their war against the government. Hence, the recognition of a belligerency status is intended to facilitate the exchange of prisoners and to give assurance that both sides observe the Geneva Convention on Warfare and the Protocol on the Treatment of Prisoners.
In the case of the MILF, it has yet to achieve that level. Its members remain roving rebel bands moving from one place to another, collecting taxes by intimidation, and at times engaging in outright pillage. For their failure to achieve that crucial status, their representatives would now want to shortcut the whole thing by suggesting the creation of a “sub-government” in areas they have yet to firmly control.
Complicating that is the fact that the MILF is not the only Islamic faction wanting to secede, and that does not include the extremist Abu Sayaff to which it has denied links. Worse, this motley band of badgering rebels is not even recognized by the Organization of Islamic States.
Paradoxically, should the government seal a peace pact with the MILF, that would be tantamount to concluding one conflict—but only to promptly renew our conflict with the Moro National Liberation Front. That could put us back to square one, because the Tausug-dominated MNLF nurtures deep resentment toward the MILF for its cozy alliance with Malaysia.
Although originally, former MNLF chairman Nur Misuari and his cohorts wanted to secede, using as their alibi the so-called Marcos dictatorship, their benefactors from Malaya, with the help of the British, insidiously mapped out a strategy to colonize their ancestral homeland. So, while the Tausug-dominated MNLFs were fighting a bloody secessionist war in Sulu and Basilan, the Malays from the Asian peninsula were forcibly integrating Sabah into the British-sponsored Federation of Malaysia.
Having realized the treachery made by the Malays and the British, the Tausugs found themselves no different from the Palestinians forcibly evicted from their homeland by the Zionists, with their former patron now shifting their support to the MILF. This explains why the MILF has not gained foothold in Sulu, Basilan and Palawan. The MNLF see in the leadership of the MILF as stooge of the Malays, and the idea of a sub-state is the same ploy intended to dismember this country with the Filipino Muslims divided in their obsession to recover Sabah.
Taking this backdrop of what a sub-state is, it is of no wonder why peace in Mindanao has remained elusive. This of course is the consequence of our indecisiveness to implement a genuine autonomy for our Muslim bothers. Remember, autonomy, rightly understood, is a political status of privilege given to inhabitants in an area. It is not ordinarily given to any province or region, and is meant to accelerate development and equalize economic opportunities without necessarily creating a new social class. It is this line that the government panel must pursue if it wants to achieve an honorable and lasting peace for our people in Mindanao.
(rodkap@yahoo.com.ph)
